Miracles, Part 2: Defeating David Hume
In our last post, we dealt with the objection to miracles presented by naturalism. We learned that naturalism cannot justify itself since it presupposes without reason the absence of anything outside of the material realm. We also learned that the claim that only empirical investigation of the physical world gives us knowledge is self-defeating, since there is no empirical method that yields such a conclusion.
Nonetheless, naturalism remains the prevailing worldview of our day. How can this be? Those who assert naturalism frequently call to their aid the argument against miracles proposed by the eighteenth century thinker David Hume in the hope that pointing to this argument will once and for all silence supernaturalism. Therefore, it behooves us to examine Hume's argument for its validity.
Hume argued that miracle claims needed to be considered against the uniformity of human experience regarding the laws of nature. Hume asserted that our uniform experience tells us that the laws of nature are inviolable, and, therefore, innately forbid such events. Hence, he concluded that it is always better to believe that a purely naturalistic explanation of the event is available if not presently known. He supported his stance with the following four rebuttals against the veracity of miracle claims: 1) It is always possible that any miracle claim could be simply inaccurate. 2) People love tabloid stories, and, therefore, may be prone to lie about such experiences. 3) Miracle claims usually occur among the ignorant and the unenlightened. 4) Miracles of similar kinds are reported in many different religions.
Four preliminary concerns
We must first recognize Hume's anchor claim concerning the inviolability of natural laws for the circular argument that it is. It assumes a priori that this is the state of affairs without proof, and it fails to disprove that God could have at some time in the past set aside these natural laws and broken into history. If an all-powerful creator God exists, then what we may think about the strength of the natural laws is irrelevant when considering the possibility of miracles.
In addition, Hume's sample of experience is too small. That is, he only lives in a particular place during a particular time. It may be that people at other places and in other times have had different yet plausible background information regarding the violability of natural laws that led them to an alternate conclusion. Hume can only tell us about his experience. But just because Hume has not seen a miracle and does not believe in miracles does not mean that someone else unknown to him has not witnessed such an event. Hume's personal world is too small for him to speak confidently about the experience of all persons in all places at all times.
Furthermore,Hume's argument from the uniformity of human experience could be applied to any unusual and unrepeatable event in history. These would include the exploits of Napoleon, the success of the American Revolution, and the conquests of Alexander the Great. All of these are highly unlikely, unrepeatable events which Hume did not witness. Why should he accept the testimony for their veracity?
Finally, modern science has gone beyond the Newtonian assumptions of Hume's day, viewing the laws of nature as more probabilistic than absolute and inviolable, leaving open the potential for an unexplainable event to occur. With all this in mind, let's consider Hume's four rebuttals against the legitimacy of miracle claims.
1) A miracle claim may be inaccurate.
This is precisely why forensic historical tools must be brought to bear on any miracle claim. If it is at all possible that God may exist and that a supernatural event may have happened, it would be unscientific to ignore the claim without an investigation. Investigating the evidence for past, unrepeatable events is the practice of forensic disciplines such as history, archaeology, anthropology, paleontology, and criminology. The tools employed in these fields can be applied to test claims of supernatural intervention as well.
2) People love tabloid stories, and, therefore, may be prone to lie about such experiences, and 3) miracle claims usually occur among the ignorant and the unenlightened.
In these objections, I count at least three logical fallacies: an attack on a straw man, an ad hominem attack on persons of lesser enlightenment than Hume, and the genetic fallacy, in this case, assuming that anyone reporting a miracle must be placed in the category of the ignorant. But Luke and the Apostle Paul were among the most educated men of their day, and persons throughout history, many very likely much smarter than Hume, have believed and publicly proclaimed that particular miracles have occurred in the past. In the end, each of these objections is a non sequitur. It may be true that some people are prone to deception and some people are "ignorant" or "unenlightened," but such shortcomings do not a priori eliminate the veracity of one's testimony regarding a specific event. Even liars and loons can accurately perceive and report that a dead man has come to life.
4) Miracle claims occur in many religions.
This complaint does not account for differences in the reliability of witnesses, the distance in time between the alleged event and the first accounting, and the quality of the event given its context and apparent purpose. These are all part of the process of assessing any such truth claim, nuances that Hume ignores when it comes to miracle claims, but which he carefully observes in his own historical works.
Conclusion
Hence, Hume fails, because his argument begs the question. Hume begins his argument against miracles by categorically denying that miracle claims are valid, which is exactly what he he must prove. He claims to have demonstrated that miracle claims are inherently untrustworthy when all he has done is declare his bias against such claims. For all we know, some miracle claims may be valid. We can only know if we investigate them. Hume presupposes that the uniformity of human experience and the inviolability of natural laws enable us to simply dismiss such claims, but he has not proven this to be the case.
And so, we are left with the possibility of miracles after all. We have peeked beyond the curtains of our stone houses and have seen a glimmer of light. Next, we will crack open the door as we begin our investigation of the most famous miracle claim in history, the resurrection of Jesus Christ. We will begin our journey by investigating the Corinthian Creed and the early proclamation of the Resurrection. Hang on to those sunglasses.
Blessings,
Arnie Gentile
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Great Post. Hume's bias has been exposed! I generally don't run into this argument when speaking with those who oppose Christ, but I may someday so it is good to know.
God Bless...
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Thanks for your comment. Actually, Hume's "argument" has filtered into our cultural mindset. Think how often believers in the miracles recorded in the Bible have been portrayed just as Hume has decribed them, i.e., ignorant and unenlightened or as not any more reliable than a tabloid article. And what about the impact of religious pluralism on our culture. Most people believe that all religions are the same and that all of their miracle claims are equal and cancel each other out.
So you may think that you are not confonting Hume's objections in real life, but you will find that they have influenced the worldview of even the most common man. This is why it is good to know their source and how to rebut them. Replies to these objections should be part and parcel of our evangelistic toolbag.
Blessings,
Arnie
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Good job on this blog! Keep up the good work.
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Thanks, Joy! You have been a big help!!
Arnie
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A blogger cites Paul Moser in The Elusive God, p. 37--
"It seems safe to say that God as morally perfect wouldn’t necessarily be bound by the kind of evidence we humans happen to prefer. Instead, we should expect to have to conform our cognitive expectations to God’s preferred evidence. On reflection, we shouldn’t be surprised by this cognitive order of priority, given divine supremacy and human inferiority."
http://apologetics315.blogspot.com/2009/12/book-review-elusive-god-by-paul-k-moser.html
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Thanks for sharing this, Peter. Very insightful and thought-provoking, and quite applicable to David Hume. I understand Paul Moser to be a major proponent of the "hiddeness of God" movement within philosophical theology, and he therefore would likely be somewhat suspicious of natural theology as well.
Blessings,
Arnie
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